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Chapter 8
Understanding Individual Account
Guarantees
Marie-Eve Lachance and Olivia S. Mitchell
Demographic aging is prompting workers everywhere to realize that they
are vulnerable to the inherent uncertainty that arises from unfunded social
security systems. This realization has prompted a global wave of social secur-
ity reforms, resulting in over twenty countries setting up individual account
(IA) plans. Interest in this movement has gained strength in the United
States with the release of the President’s Commission to Strengthen Social
Security (CSSS) Final Report, in which voluntary IAs are proposed as a
component of a reformed system.1
Key strengths of IAs are that participants gain ownership in their accounts
and may diversify their pension investments. But in view of the recent demise
of Enron, some have argued that access to capital market investments might
impose new risk on IA participants.2 Concern over capital market volatility
has consequently prompted some policymakers to propose ‘‘guarantees’’
for defined contribution pension accumulations.3 Abroad, such guarantees
have already been adopted in several Latin American countries undergoing
reform,4 and more recently, in Japan and Germany.5
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate how one might evaluate pension
guarantees in the context of an IA component of a social security reform.6
Plan designers and budget analysts should recognize guarantee costs and
identify how they can be financed. Sensible public policy that proposes
new guarantees must identify who will pay for them and why. In what fol-
lows, the first section, ‘‘An Overview of pension Guarantees,’’ surveys the
major guarantee designs adopted or suggested in a social security context.
The section entitled ‘‘Models for costing pension Guarantees,’’ provides the
background necessary to analyze guarantee costs. The third section on Illus-
trating Guarantee Costs, provides five examples of guarantee designs and
The authors are grateful for comments provided by Zvi Bodie, Neil Doherty, Alex Muermann,
and Kent Smetters. They also benefited from research support provided by the Michigan Retire-
ment Research Center, the Shannon Schieber Memorial Fund, and the Society of Actuaries
(Lachance); the Pension Research Council (Mitchell); and the Department of Insurance and
Risk Management at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania (both authors).
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their cost estimates, using the methodology and assumptions developed in
the Appendix. A fourth section on Financing pension Accumulation Guar-
antees, discusses alternative financing options for the pension guarantee,
and a final section concludes.
An Overview of Pension Guarantees
While many alternative pension guarantee mechanisms could be envisaged,
they may be classified into two general categories: minimum rate of return
guarantees, and minimum benefit guarantees.
Under a minimum rate of return guarantee, plan participants would be
entitled to receive payments at least equal to their lifetime contributions to
the system plus some rate of return. One variant on this theme is a ‘‘prin-
cipal guarantee,’’ which is equivalent to guaranteeing a nominal rate of
return of zero percent. This approach has been adopted in Germany and
Japan, under which participants must receive at least their plan contrib-
utions at retirement (but not before). A more generous design proposed
by Feldstein and Samwick (2001) involves a ‘‘real principal guarantee,’’
under which participants would be guaranteed their lifetime contributions
adjusted according to an inflation index. Still a more generous guarantee
might promise participants their contributions plus some minimum rate
of return. For example, participants could be told that they would always
receive their contributions plus the return on a government bond (e.g. the
10-year Treasury bond).7
Irrespective of the particular guaranteed rate of return adopted, cost
will depend in part on how often the guarantee threshold is tested. In
many designs, as in the German and Japanese cases, the guarantee is eval-
uated only once, at the end of the plan participant’s worklife. In other
instances, the minimum rate of return is imposed annually. In Uruguay, for
instance, the investment-based system provides pension participants a min-
imum annual real rate of return of two percent. In Chile, pension funds
must pay an annual real rate of return that is a function of the average
annual real rate of return earned by the entire set of pension funds and
in Colombia, the guaranteed rate of return is evaluated over 3-year periods
(Fischer, 1999; Pennachi, 1999).
A prominent alternative to a minimum rate of return guarantee is a min-
imum benefit guarantee. In this second approach, plan participants are
promised that the benefits they will receive from social security at retire-
ment will be at least as high as a minimum annuity, irrespective of their
account’s actual investment performance. For instance, the Chilean reform
provides a ‘‘minimum annuity’’ to defined contribution participants, fin-
anced by a pay-as-you-go program (Zarita, 1994; Pennachi, 1999). Some
social security systems have adopted a multi-pillar structure of benefits in
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which the participant receives the combination of a defined benefit annu-
ity (first-pillar) and an IA (second-pillar). Under this design, evaluating
possible program costs must take into account the sum of these benefits,
and compare them to the minimum annuity. In the United States context,
Feldstein and Samwick (2001) describe a ‘‘mixed’’ system where part of
the participant’s social security tax could be contributed to an IA while the
remainder is used to finance the pay-as-you-go program. Their suggested
model also includes a guarantee that participants would receive benefits at
least as great as under the present law benefit formula.8
The Moral Hazard Issue
In addition to the guarantee formulas described above, another factor
influencing the cost of the guarantee is the level of investment risk taken by
the IA participant. Participants may boost the cost of the guarantee, if they
elect to hold riskier investments in their portfolios. Naturally this can give
rise to a moral hazard problem, as recognized by Bodie and Merton (1993)
and Smetters (2002), among others.
Several tools are available to address the moral hazard problem. One
would be to specify a standard investment portfolio and provide the guaran-
tee only to those participants who elected that standard portfolio. Another
approach would let participants invest in the portfolio of their choosing, but
then guarantee payments would be computed using the standard portfolio
as a benchmark, rather than the participant’s actual investment returns.
This second approach leaves participants with more investment flexibil-
ity, though it would not protect them against investment risk greater than
experienced by the standard portfolio.
Models for Costing Pension Guarantees
This section models guarantee outcomes under the two approaches out-
lined above, and it further illustrates likely guarantee costs using financial
techniques for determining the economic cost of guaranteed pension
payments.
Guaranteeing Retirement Income
It is useful to develop a simple notation for costing both the minimum rate of
return and minimum benefit guarantee approaches. Denote by T the number
of years over which a plan participant contributes to his IA. For a young
worker (i.e. a new system participant), the period T corresponds to the
length of the full worklife. By contrast, when the system is first introduced,
a more senior worker would have a much shorter window during which he
could contribute to his IA. Further, let IAT and GT denote, respectively, the
value of the IA and of a given guarantee formula at retirement.
“chap08” — 2003/6/4 — page 162 — #6
162 Lachance and Mitchell
G
ua
ra
n
te
e 
Pa
ym
en
ts
IA < Guarantee 
Guarantee 
“in-the-money”
IA > Guarantee 
Guarantee 
“out-of-the-money”
Individual
Account Value
Guaranteed 
Individual
Account Balance 
at Retirement 
Figure 8-1. Guarantee payments as a function of the IA Value. (Source: Authors’
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The guarantee payments can then be specified depending on the
account’s investment result. No guarantee is paid at retirement if, at that
time, the IA accumulation exceeds the value of the guarantee: IAT > GT .
But if the value of the IA is below the guaranteed minimum, then the guar-
antee payment must cover the difference (i.e. GT − IAT ). The guarantee
payoffs, illustrated in Figure 8-1, may be represented as follows:
fT = max[0, GT − IAT ]. (8.1)
It must be noted that equation (1) is applicable in the case of a newly
created IA system, with no legacy commitment from a prior system. More
generally, IA models sometimes develop after a partial or full conversion
from a prior pay-as-you-go program. Under a full conversion, the parti-
cipant would receive the sum of his IA and (possibly) an additional benefit
reflecting his participation under the legacy system. Under a partial conver-
sion (or ‘‘mixed’’ system), the participant would receive a combination of
his IA and also a defined benefit component as specified under the old plan,
perhaps subject to adjustment. Thus under a minimum benefit guarantee, it
is necessary to adjust equation (1) by adding to the IA value any additional
benefits.
To illustrate this point, we examine how one might adjust equation (8.1)
for a ‘‘mixed’’ reform. Under the United States social security system, for
instance, workers are promised a retirement annuity with present value, SST .
If voluntary IAs were to be permitted, participant would likely be allowed
to divert a portion (but not all) of their social security contributions to a
funded defined contribution pension account. To compensate the Trust
Fund for the loss in contributions, the promised social security annuity
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would have to be reduced by an offset amount. The President’s Commission
(2001) proposed to calculate such an offset by asking, in effect, how much
IA contributions would be expected to accumulate under a given rate of
return. Letting OffsetT and SSREDT represent, respectively, the offset and
the reduced annuity, then a minimum benefit guarantee for a ‘‘mixed’’ social
security system can be represented by:
fT = max
[
0, GT − (IAT + SSREDT )
]
, (8.2)
or equivalently,
fT = max
[
0, GT − (IAT + (SST − OffsetT ))
]
. (8.3)
Finally, we note that in (8.2) and (8.3), social security benefits are assumed
to be paid with certainty. Potential costs associated with the funding of social
security benefits should be handled separately; that is, legacy system costs
are properly attributed to the old system, and not to the guarantee.9
Costing Guarantee Payoffs with Option-Pricing
Techniques
The discussion above shows that a pension guarantee can provide investors
with a floor of protection against the chance of a capital market loss. In
turn, the guarantee represents a liability to the sponsor, be it a private sector
group---a plan sponsor, an insurer, a financial services firm---or a government
entity. Over the last decade, as a result of experience with the Savings and
Loan crisis as well as other government guarantee programs, the Congres-
sional Budget Office (CBO) and the General Accounting Office (GAO)
have increasingly taken the position that government guarantees should be
evaluated and costed as to their budgetary impact. If a pension guarantee
were to be included in an IA plan proposal, it would be necessary to estimate
and recognize the financial cost of such a promise. That is, irrespective of
whether guarantees are provided by a government entity or private sector
firms, it is essential to account properly for their costs since real economic
resources are required to finance them.
In practice, there is much confusion regarding how to compute the eco-
nomic value of such guarantee payments. One reason is that the economic
cost of providing the pension guarantee may not necessarily equal the recip-
ient’s valuation of the guarantee.10 In this chapter, we focus only on the
economic value of the pension guarantee for the provider,11 referred to as
‘‘guarantee costs’’ below. Another reason is that more than one approach has
been suggested to evaluate pension guarantee costs. The simplest approach
is to project what pension guarantee payments might be according to a
set of stochastic assumptions and take their expectation (cf. Feldstein and
Samwick, 2001). This expectation approach has the merit of being easy to
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apply and explain; it is particularly useful when more sophisticated tech-
niques cannot be adopted. On the other hand, this expectation approach
does not incorporate an adjustment for the economic value of risk, so it
would tend to underestimate guarantee costs.
An approach that does adjust guarantee costs for risk recognizes that the
shape of the guarantee payments in Figure 8-1 conforms to a ‘‘put option.’’
Indeed, the pension literature has long recognized that option-pricing
techniques12 can be used to value options related to pension obligations
(e.g. Merton, Bodie, and Marcus, 1987). To apply this methodology, one
must first detail the stochastic processes for the guarantee formula and the
investment portfolio.13 Then, risk-neutral valuation14 is used to obtain the
guarantee costs from this model. In the special case where the guaranteed
portfolio consists of a single contribution that grows with investment returns
over time and where the returns follow a lognormal distribution, the risk-
neutral valuation technique corresponds to the well-known Black--Scholes
formula. The obvious advantage of this approach, as illustrated by Bodie
(2001) and Smetters (2002), is that it provides a closed-form solution for
the guarantee costs.
More realism in the pension plan design can be introduced by permitting
the pension investments to be deposited as a series of periodic contribu-
tions, rather than as a one-time investment. In this latter case, a closed-form
solution for the guarantee costs is more difficult to find, but Monte Carlo
simulations and the risk-neutral valuation technique can be used to model
a wide variety of guarantee formulas and portfolio structures. Analysts who
have used risk-neutral valuation techniques to value guarantees in this more
complex pension framework include Pennachi (1999, 2000) who examined
guarantees in Uruguay and Chile, Zarita (1994) who modeled guarantees
in Chile, Fischer (1999) who evaluated Colombia’s pension guarantee, and
Feldstein and Ranguelova (2000) who explored the feasibility of pension
collars for the United States.
In the present chapter we also adopt this technique to evaluate the types
of pension guarantees that might be suggested in the context of a possible
United States social security reform, one that combines a new defined con-
tribution individual account component with a more traditional defined
benefit structure. While specific model details are provided in the appendix
for interested readers, it is useful to provide a short description of our
application of this process. As a first step, it is necessary to risk-adjust the
probability distributions of the underlying securities held in the pension
portfolio. This probability adjustment is made such that risk-adjusted return
processes are expected to yield the risk-free rate. Expectations taken with
these risk-adjusted probabilities are represented by the operator Eˆ . Second,
the pension guarantee payments can be projected to time T and discounted
back at the risk-free rate using the appropriate formulas. Third, the value
of the pension guarantee is obtained by taking the risk-adjusted expected
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value of the discounted guarantee payments. The process may be summar-
ized analytically in equation (8.4) below. Letting r¯ represent the average
risk-free rate over the period, the no-arbitrage value f of a derivative that
pays fT at time T is given by:15
f = Eˆ [exp(−r¯ T )fT ]. (8.4)
Nature of the Downside Risk
As was shown above, having a pension guarantee is potentially valuable
because of the ‘‘downside risk’’ inherent in IA investments. It is interest-
ing that popular belief regarding the nature of this downside risk tends to
downplay the cost of such guarantees. For instance, it is often recommen-
ded that investors with long investment horizons hold a larger proportion
of stocks in their portfolios. This view is grounded in the argument that
stocks are less risky in the long run or, putting it another way, that investors
have more time to recoup their losses with longer investment horizons. His-
torically, stocks have outperformed bonds over long investment horizons,16
so the belief is that this trend will repeat in the future, resulting in costless
guarantees.
Empirical evidence on this point is provided in Figure 8-2, which
graphs historical annual nominal returns payable to short-term investors
in US stock and bond indexes over the period 1942--2000. The figure
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Figure 8-2. Annual returns for US Stock and Bond Markets, 1942--2000. (Source :
Author’s computations, data from CRSP; historical annual stock returns from S&P
500 index including dividends; bond returns from an index of 10-year Treasuries.)
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confirms that in the United States, at least, stock returns have historic-
ally exceeded bond returns, but with higher volatility. Over the period,
the average annual (nominal) return was 14.6 percent on a stock index
fund (S&P 500) compared to an average bond fund return of 5.8 percent.
The volatility of the stock index over the same period was also higher, at
16.5 percent, compared to bond volatility of 9 percent. (Asset volatility is con-
ventionally measured by the standard deviation of historical returns around
the mean). These data illustrate the so-called ‘‘equity premium’’---that is,
because stocks (equities) are seen by the market as more volatile and hence
riskier than bonds, purchasers of stocks require an additional risk premium
or return in order to hold them.
AQ:
Caption for
fig. 3 not
given. Pls.
check
While all would agree that higher volatility means more risk for short-
term holding periods, there is more controversy over returns on assets
over longer period. Figure 8-3 illustrates the volatility of stock returns for
longer investment horizons, using the same underlying data as Figure 8-2,
but now expressing the volatility of total returns over periods between 1 and
30 years. What becomes clear is that the annualized stock returns become less
volatile over time, but the opposite is true for compounded stock returns.17
Applied to the guarantee context, these findings imply that the volatility of
IA accounts should increase over time, because this volatility is affected by
compounded, rather than annual, returns. Consequently, guarantee volatil-
ity rises over time, rather than being diversified away over longer investment
periods.
A closer examination of Figure 8-3 reveals that, for investment peri-
ods longer than 25 years, volatility estimates become unstable, due to the
paucity of return data for long investment periods. Over the post-WWII
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period, there are at best two independent observations for the 30-year
period returns.18 Clearly, data limitations weaken confidence regarding
the claim that stocks outperform bonds over long-term investment periods.
Experts using data from other countries also suggest that the US pattern is
an exception, since other countries exhibit much smaller long-term equity
premiums.19 Further, past data may be a rather poor predictor of future
performance, so extrapolating the potential costs of a guarantee from this
data can be deceptive.
Illustrating Guarantee Costs
To provide a better understanding of the factors determining guarantee
costs, this section presents and analyzes several examples. We show how pen-
sion guarantee costs depend on three key factors: the relation between the
guarantee formula and the benefit structure, the volatility of the investor’s
portfolio, and the interaction between these two elements and the investor’s
investment horizon.
Five specific structures for guarantee designs help illustrate the interac-
tions between pension guarantee formulas and benefit structures. The first
three IA guarantee designs discussed are examples of a minimum rate of
return guarantee, differentiated according to the rate of return guaranteed.
Example 1 illustrates the cost of providing a principal guarantee, one that
promises the participant the return of his contributions at retirement (equi-
valent to a zero nominal interest rate). Example 2 offers a real principal
guarantee, one that promises the participant the return of his contribu-
tions with an adjustment for purchasing power at retirement (equivalent to
a zero real interest rate). Example 3 provides the participant a guarantee
that his individual account provides his principal plus a minimum interest
rate equal to a 10-year Treasury bond return.
Two additional examples are taken from the minimum benefit family of
guarantees. Examples 4 and 5 consider a ‘‘mixed’’ system of social security
benefits such as the one described in general terms in the second section.20
In this context, we refer to SST as ‘‘present law benefits,’’ or the benefits
projected according to the formulas in effect under the traditional social
security system. The social security benefit formula does not incorporate
any minimum or floor benefit on its own. Hence the guarantees provided
in Examples 4 and 5 ensure that the retiree receives a total payment equal
to the larger of the present law benefit or the poverty line.21
It will be recalled that in a ‘‘mixed’’ system, the retirement benefit consists
of the sum of the annuity SSREDT and a payment from the IAT . In Example
4, as we have constructed it, the plan participant may invest 2 percent of
his earnings to an IA, in lieu of paying social security taxes in that amount.
Example 5 considers a larger IA system, where the participant can contribute
6 percent of his earnings to an IA. For both examples, in exchange for its
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participation in the IA, the participant’s annuity is obtained by subtracting
an ‘‘offset’’ from the present law benefits, that is, SSREDT = SST − OffsetT .
This offset is equivalent to the participant’s IA contributions accumulated
at the 3-month T -bill rate of return.22
The social security benefit formula is progressive, providing low earners
a higher replacement rate though a lower dollar amount, as compared to
higher earners. The guarantee formulas examined here promise different
replacement rates by income level, as compared to present law. We illustrate
this sensitivity to earnings levels in Example 4 by contrasting the guarantee
costs for two hypothetical workers: one at medium earnings level correspond-
ing to the Social Security system’s Average Wage Index (AWI), and another
at a low earnings level representing 45 percent of this amount. Guarantee
costs are also influenced by how the participant invests his IA account.
To show this, we develop guarantee cost estimates for three alternative
IA portfolios: one fully invested in equities; a second one invested half
in equities and half in bonds; and a third held all in bonds. The role
of the investment horizon is depicted through the use of four different
contribution periods, with IA contributions occurring over, respectively 10,
20, 30, and 40 years.
For each of the variations just listed, Tables 8-1--8-3 express the cost of
providing the guarantee in question, for the specific investment mix, earn-
ings level, and saving horizon illustrated. These costs are computed using
the valuation method outlined in the second section of this chapter, and
presented in a variety of units: as a percent of assets (Table 8-1), in present
value dollars (Table 8-2), and as a percentage of lifetime contributions
(Table 8-3). (The Appendix details the assumptions underlying the cal-
culations.) Throughout this section, we refer mainly to Table 4-1’s costs
expressed in basis points (hundredths of a percent of assets) because it is
conventional to refer to costs associated with managing retirement accounts
in those terms. However, this measure does not readily reflect changes in
costs associated with varying the contribution rate or the investment hori-
zon. Hence, for some purposes, we explore present value dollar costs from
Table 8-2.
Guarantee Formula and Benefit Structure
For ease of discussion, we take as the base case a participant with a 50/50
stock/bond portfolio and a 40-year investment horizon. For such an investor,
Line 8 of Table 8-1 shows that the cost of guaranteeing the 10-year Treas-
ury bond return (Example 3) would be 0.65 percent of assets annually,
or 65 basis points (bps). Alternatively, this is worth $3,406 in present
value dollars (Table 8-2), or equivalently, 16 percent of total contribu-
tions (Table 8-3). To understand why the guarantee is expensive, it is
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helpful to look at the anticipated gap between the value of the guaran-
tee and the benefits provided by the IA.23 In the base case, the expected
values of the IA and the guarantee are equal.24 Therefore, guarantee pay-
ments will be generated as soon as the IA portfolio provides a below-mean
return.
In the cases of Examples 1 and 2, the principal and real principal guar-
antees, the guaranteed amounts represent, respectively, only 30 percent
and 52 percent of the expected IA value. Consequently the IA’s investment
performance would have to be significantly worse than expected before
any guarantee would be paid; those payments will also be smaller in size
as compared to Example 3. This translates into lower guarantee costs, as
illustrated in Line 8 of Table 8-1: the guarantee costs drop to 0 and 2 bp,
respectively. Of course guarantee costs this low indicates that such guaran-
tees provide limited protection against investment risk. Although we have
ignored administrative costs associated with the guarantee, in this case it is
interesting to note that such fees could even exceed the guarantee payments
themselves.
Continuing with the base case and moving along Line 8, we next con-
sider the minimum benefit guarantees of Examples 4 and 5. Recall that
for these examples, the minimum benefit is defined as the US present
law benefit, plus a poverty line minimum income. Here the expected
gap between the guarantee and the retiree’s benefits is influenced by the
participant’s lifetime earnings level.25 For the low earner, the guarantee
represents from 100 percent to 120 percent of expected benefits under
the mixed system, whereas this ratio is always 100 percent for the medium
income earner. It is worth noting that the minimum benefit guarantee
in this case introduces benefit improvements unrelated to the provision
of investment risk protection. To see this, we note that the guarantee is
costly even when the low earner invests his IA entirely in a bond portfo-
lio: as indicated in Table 8-1, providing a minimum benefit for the low
earner investing only in bonds still costs from 6 bp to 29.38 percent of
assets.
Finally, costs are also influenced by the size of the IA. To illustrate this,
Examples 4 and 5 compare two different systems, one with an IA con-
tribution rate of 2 percent and the other with a contribution rate of 6
percent. A larger IA introduces more risk, which in turn results in higher
costs for the guarantee. The guarantees cost the same amount in basis
points (Table 8-1) but these are based on higher contributions and higher
assets. To better judge the magnitude of the guarantee cost, dollar figures
are presented in Table 4-2. Line 8 shows that as the contribution rate is
tripled from 2 to 6 percent, the present value of guarantee costs is also
tripled, rising from $3,401 to $10,204. This confirms that a minimum
benefit guarantee in the context of a larger investment account is more
costly.
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Volatility of the Investment Portfolio
The illustrations also reveal that meeting a guarantee threshold is more
likely if the IA is invested in more volatile assets; thus boosting the alloca-
tion in equities always results in greater guarantee costs. For instance, when
we move from the base case with a 50/50 stock/bond mix to a portfolio
invested all in equities, the cost of the guarantee doubles from 65 to 127 bp
(Table 8-1, Example 3, Lines 4 versus 8). Reducing the fraction in equities
to zero eliminates guarantee costs in the Example 3 case, of course, because
the IA portfolio cannot do worse than the guaranteed benefit.
This implies that giving IA participants a choice over investment mix could
be costly, in that they might boost the guarantee cost by selecting a riskier
investment portfolio. In general, it would be dangerous to provide parti-
cipants with an IA guarantee without placing restrictions on their portfolio
mix. However, Table 8-1 reveals that, for some guarantee designs, the impact
of the investment portfolio on costs is less than in the base case. When guar-
antees are either very likely or very unlikely to be exercised, their costs are
less sensitive to the portfolio allocation.
Interaction with Investment Horizon
As mentioned above, some observers contend that lengthening the invest-
ment horizon might result in lower guarantee costs, because they believe
that investment risk decreases over time. Nevertheless, Bodie (1995) showed
that a put option guaranteeing the risk-free rate becomes more expensive
as the investment horizon widens. In practice, the relation between guaran-
tee costs and investment horizon proves to be fairly complex, as Table 8-2
reveals. This relation is determined by the evolution over time of the two
factors defined in this section: the relation between the guarantee formula
versus the benefit structure, and the IA volatility.
It will be recalled that, in the base case, the expected value of the guaran-
tee formula and the IA are equal, which implies that the guarantee costs are
only driven by volatility. As the investment horizon lengthens, so too does
the size of the IA and its volatility. Since guarantee costs increase with volat-
ility, the cost of the guarantee would be expected to rise with the investment
horizon. Comparing Lines 5 and 8 of Table 8-2, we see that lengthening the
investment horizon from 10 to 40 years in Example 3 results in costs rising
more than proportionally, from $570 to $3,406. On the other hand, the cost
of the principal guarantees (Examples 1 and 2) falls with time, rather than
rising. This is because under the principal guarantee, the guarantee cost
falls as a percent of the IA from 71 to 30 percent as the time period is exten-
ded from 10 to 40 years. The fact that the guarantee becomes less generous
over time dominates the volatility effect and explains why the principal guar-
antee costs fall over time. Similarly, for the low earner in Example 4, the
social security annuity grows over time at a faster rate than does the poverty
“chap08” — 2003/6/4 — page 174 — #18
174 Lachance and Mitchell
line, which makes it less likely that the guarantee will pay off for the longer
holding period.
Financing Pension Accumulation Guarantees
Proposals to include guarantees in an IA model must specify not only their
costs, as outlined above, but also how they could be financed. Financing
decisions include several aspects:
• Who will bear the guarantee costs? (e.g. participants, taxpayers)
• Who will manage the guarantee and how? (e.g. private sector, govern-
ment agency)
• What will the price structure be? (e.g. one price for all, prices
differentiated by earnings level, portfolio mix, time horizon, etc.)
This section examines several issues related to these three questions.
Guarantee Financing: Pay-as-you-go versus
Self-Financed
Feldstein and Liebman (2001) have suggested that the risk associated with
guarantees could either be shifted to future taxpayers or transferred to
private markets.26 One way to pay for an IA guarantee is to allow parti-
cipants to elect self-financed guaranteed choices from a menu of investment
options. Financial institutions could offer ‘‘guaranteed return accounts’’ in
the set of investment choices for people willing to pay for them. In this
case, participants desirous of a guaranteed investment product would pay
the premium, irrespective of whether the government or the private sector
managed the accounts. (In Germany and Japan, private financial service
firms are slated to provide the guaranteed accounts.)
An advantage of the self-financing approach to guarantees is that those
who most value the enhanced security would also be those who would
pay for it. Less risk-averse people would not have to subsidize the more
risk-averse. In addition, since guarantee costs rise with the size of the port-
folio being guaranteed in this context, financing would be more expensive
for higher earners with larger accounts. Having those who value guaran-
tees most pay for them avoids the poor potentially having to subsidize the
risk-averse rich.
A potential disadvantage of self-financing guarantees is that some low-
wage earners might value a guarantee more highly, yet they would be least
able to afford it. Financing guarantee costs for the poor, in this case, might
require subsidizing low-income savers out of general revenue. This might be
feasible, but it also might detract from the appeal of guaranteed accounts
to the extent that additional revenue would have to be identified to pay for
them. Even in this case, however, it is critical to note that guarantee costs do
not disappear just because the federal government shoulders them. Failing
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to report economic costs and benefits of guarantees cannot avoid the reality
that economic resources are still at risk under the guarantee, and value is
being transferred to participants.
If guarantee costs were passed on to future taxpayers instead of having
participants self-finance them, it would mean that future taxes would have
to be devoted to the system when guarantees were ‘‘in the money.’’ A major
problem with this tactic is that the guarantor could be asked to pay out
precisely when economic conditions were bleak. This could occur if the
stock market and the economy collapsed at the same time, for instance. In
such a circumstance, taxpayers might be unable or unwilling to raise taxes on
themselves to cover the guarantees, even if promises had been made in the
past. In other words, it is incorrect to assume that the federal government
has ‘‘deep pockets’’ and can simply raise taxes on future workers to cover
shortfalls whenever IA investments perform poorly.
Indeed, one might ask whether such guarantees could be any more reli-
able than present social security promises. The law has established that
traditional social security benefit promises are payable only when reven-
ues are sufficient to cover them (Fleming v. Nestor, 1960). A similar point
could be made about any form of guarantee: in a massive economic
downturn, the promises would be worth no more than could be paid. A
related issue is that supporters of IAs often state that these accounts are
useful in building wealth and reducing unfunded tax claims on our chil-
dren and grandchildren. Instituting guarantees without making them self-
financed represents a new entitlement likely inconsistent with the reform
philosophy.
The Choice of a Guarantee Provider
Although a guarantee resembles an insurance contract, its underlying risk
is not diversifiable; hence, it cannot be managed with traditional insurance
‘‘pooling’’ techniques. Figure 8-1 shows that the guarantee payments are
asymmetric and this shape is preserved even when guarantee payments of
all IA participants are aggregated. This shape cannot be replicated by simply
depositing the premiums into an insurance fund. However if these premi-
ums were used to purchase the appropriate financial instruments, it would
be possible to obtain the desired structure of payoffs. As an example, Bodie
(2001) discusses how investment accumulation products could be guaran-
teed with the use of a combination of capital market instruments.27 In the
eventuality that these products are not available in the capital markets,28
their payoffs could be replicated by applying option-pricing techniques to
a portfolio of appropriate securities.
When the guarantee payoffs can be replicated by the derivative strategy
just described, either the government (or one of its agencies) or private pro-
viders would be able to offer the guarantee.29 In practice, several elements
“chap08” — 2003/6/4 — page 176 — #20
176 Lachance and Mitchell
of the guarantee contract cannot be hedged in capital markets (e.g. lifetime
earnings, retirement age, etc.) To deal with this issue, one might imagine
financial service firms offering contracts that are standardized in terms of
earnings, portfolio mix, retirement age, and so forth. This approach has the
advantage of reducing moral hazard, but it also subjects the participant to
more risk due to the difference between his idiosyncratic situation and the
standardized case (the ‘‘basis risk,’’ in the options literature). If guarantees
were not standardized, it would become more difficult for private providers
to manage these contracts and it becomes more likely that the government
would provide the guarantee. This is because the government may be better
able to transfer losses to future generations, as compared to financial insti-
tutions. Such constraints could be mitigated if the private providers had
access to reinsurance. Finally, if the guarantees featured some element of
subsidy, private providers would be unable to manage the entire program
without additional support.
Price Structure
The illustrations in the third section showed that the price of a guarantee
is sensitive to the individual investor’s characteristics and to his portfolio
allocation. Consequently, a well-designed pricing strategy should avoid the
creation of opportunities for adverse selection and moral hazard. In this
context we have already mentioned the need to have the guarantee linked
to a specific IA portfolio mix. Depending on the guarantee structure, pro-
viders too can be subject to moral hazard. Making the guarantee provider
responsible for asset allocation provides an incentive to invest in safer assets
(Jensen and Sorensen, 2000). In Colombia, for instance, the guarantee
premium under the IA program is not adjusted for risk; partly as a result,
only 0.3 percent of the funds were invested in shares (as of December 1996;
Fischer, 1999)).
Discussion and Conclusions
Opponents of IAs tend to understate the problems facing underfunded
national pay-as-you-go social security systems, overlooking the fact that
reductions in outlays and increases in revenues will be required to close
the future financing gap. It is precisely the social security system’s loom-
ing insolvency that makes current systems politically risky. Including IAs
in a national social security reform plan can strengthen old-age economic
security. These accounts can reduce the political risk confronting aging
Americans when they assess the chances of actually receiving promised
benefits under the insolvent social security system. These accounts also
afford participants the opportunity to save in a cost-effective manner, and
to diversify their investments in ways that they may not be able to at
present.
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Nonetheless, there may be concern among policymakers that IA parti-
cipants will face capital market risk, particularly if they concentrate their
accounts in stock market investments in the pursuit of higher returns. One
approach to this problem is to restrict the extent of equities allowed in
workers’ accounts; another is to offer guarantees.
This chapter has explored several guarantee designs and assessed their
likely costs. It shows that offering guarantees on defined contribution pen-
sion accounts could be costly, even when participants are restricted to
holding no more than half their portfolio in stock and the rest in bonds.
For instance, in this framework our model suggests that a 10-year Treasury
bond return guarantee would still require increasing annual contributions
by 65 bps, or 16 percent of contributions, for the long-term saver. This
would likely be perceived as a substantial cost increase over and above the
basic contribution by most plan participants. If these costs were not self-
financed, substantial subsidies would be required. Subsidies of this sort
must be measured, recognized, and their financing implications spelled
out in detail for a full accounting of the economic costs and benefits of
guarantees.
These cost estimates might seem high to people accustomed to the argu-
ment that stock returns are expected to outperform bond returns over time.
We argue, however, that because of the paucity of independent observations
in historical data on long holding periods, past returns are noisy predictors
of future returns. In addition, guarantee costs are driven by stock and bond
volatility rather than their expected returns.
Appendix: An Illustration of Option-Pricing
Techniques Applied to Individual Accounts
This Appendix details the modeling assumptions used to derive cost estim-
ates for the illustrative examples discussed in the text. We summarize
guarantee costs for four workers who participate in the IA program for,
respectively, T = 10, 20, 30, and 40 years. It is assumed that the IA starts in
2004 and economic variables are projected accordingly. Sections A and B of
this Appendix describe the economic and demographic assumptions. The
stochastic processes followed by the bills, bonds, and stocks are modeled
separately in Section C. Section D details the elements necessary to com-
pute the IA values as well as the social security annuity. Section E derives
the cost of each guarantee formula while Section F shows how to generate
numerical values for the guarantee costs using a Monte Carlo simulation.
A. Economic Assumptions
All projections are expressed in nominal values, with the inflation and
real processes modeled separately. Assumptions for inflation growth, real
wage growth, and real interest rates are taken from the OASDI Annual
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Report (2001). In that report, the intermediate scenario assumes that
real wage growth is g = 1.0 percent, while inflation grows at i = 3.3
percent. By combining these two assumptions, the result is a 4.3 percent
nominal wage growth assumption. According to the intermediate scenario,
the real interest rate assumption is r REAL = 3 percent. This fixed interest
rate assumption is used for the annuity calculation in Section B, while the
remaining calculations use the stochastic model of Section C.
At the inception of the IAs, earnings levels are denoted by W0. In sub-
sequent years, earnings Wt are obtained by projecting these initial earnings
with a fixed rate of 4.3 percent. Two categories of wages are used in the sim-
ulations: the medium earner correspond to the Social Security Actuary’s AWI
while a low earner represents 45 percent of this amount. For instance, the low
and medium earners would have received $17,785 and $32,155, respectively
in 2000.30 Finally, according to the US Census Bureau, the poverty line for
singles over 65 years old was $8,494 in 2001, a level assumed to grow with
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) over time.
B. Demographic Assumptions
The four illustrative cases are assumed to be, respectively, 22, 32, 42, and
52 years old at the inception of the IA system. Each participant is assumed
to retire at the early retirement age of 62 years. At this age, the value of
a $1 annuity with payments indexed to inflation is denoted by the annuity
factor a¨62. To compute this annuity factor, it is necessary to define survival
probabilities after retirement. The standard notation t p62 is used to denote
the probability that an individual retiring at age 62 would still be alive at
age 62+t . Post-retirement survival probabilities are derived from the Social
Security 1997 period life table31 (pre-retirement mortality is not included
in the model). As for the real interest rate used to discount the annuity
payments, it is taken from the Old age survivor and disability insurance
(OASDI) intermediate scenario. Letting the last age (radix) of the mortality
table be represented by ω, the value of the annuity factor is given by:
a¨62 =
ω−1−62∑
t=0
(1 + r REAL)−tt p62. (8.7)
C. Stochastic Processes (risk-adjusted)
Risk-Free Rate
The continuous risk-free rate is defined by Vasicek’s (1977) mean reverting
model:
drt = κ(µ− rt )dt + σdW rt , (8.8)
where dW rt is a standardized Wiener process and the initial risk-free rate is
given by r0 = r . According to Hull (1997), the current term structure should
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lead directly to the risk-neutral process for interest rates and the necessary
risk-adjustments are incorporated in (8). For estimation and simulation
purposes, it will be useful to take advantage of the fact that the Vasicek
model leads to the following normal representation of the risk-free rate:
rt |rt−1 = µ(1 − e−k)+ e−k rt−1 + σ
√
(1 − e−2κ)/2κεt
εt ∼ N (0, 1).
(8.9)
Equation (8.9) corresponds to a simple regression and its parameters can
be estimated by online library system (OLS). For this estimation, the risk-
free rate is represented by the 3-month T-Bill annual time series for the
period 1980--2001. The period between World War II and October 1979 is
excluded due to the Federal Reserve policy of stabilizing interest rates at
the time. Using this data, the OLS parameters estimates are respectively
r0 = 2 percent, κˆ = 80 percent, µˆ = 3.0 percent, and σˆ = 2 percent. The
annual risk-free rate values can then be simulated by generating a series of
error terms εt and substituting them into equation (9).
Bond Returns
To compute the bond portfolio return, we take advantage of the direct rela-
tion between the movements of the risk-free rate and bond returns. The
bond portfolio is invested in 10-year Treasury zero coupon bonds, assumed
to be rebalanced annually. The same assumptions apply to the 10-year Treas-
ury guarantee in Example 3. When it is computed with the Vasicek model,
the price at time t of a bond with time to maturity τ can be represented as
follows:
P (τ , rt ) = eA(τ )−B(τ )rt (8.10)
where,
A(τ ) = (B(τ )− τ)
(
µ− σ
2
2κ2
)
− σ
2B(τ )2
4κ
B(τ ) = 1 − e
−κτ
τ
.
Since it is assumed that the 10-year bond fund is rebalanced annually, its
annual return Bt is given by the percentage increase in price after 1 year:
Bt = P (9, rt+1)P (10, rt ) − 1, (8.11)
where rt and rt+1 are generated by (9). Note that there is no relation between
the notations Bt and B(τ ).
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Stock Returns
Letting SIt represent the stock index level at time t , the continuous stock
returns are modeled by the following geometric Brownian motion:
dSIt
S It
= rt dt + σdW St , (8.12)
where dW St is a standardized Wiener process, which we assumed to be uncor-
related with the one in equation (8.8). Following the risk-neutral valuation
technique, the drift of the return process in (8.12) is set equal to the risk-free
rate. In addition, let St denote the annual stock return in year t . Then St is
distributed according to a lognormal distribution and can be represented
by:
ln(1 + St ) = rt − σ 2/2 + σεt , where εt ∼ N (0, 1) (8.13)
or, equivalently
St = exp(rt − σ 2/2 + σεt )− 1. (8.14)
To estimate the parameter σ , we note that equation (8.13) is normally
distributed with standard deviation σ . The usual estimator can then be
applied to obtain σˆ = 20 percent. Stock return data for the estimation
were taken from the S&P 500 Index (including dividends) during the period
1926--2000. Using this parameter estimate, the annual stock returns are sim-
ulated by generating a series of error terms εt and substituting them into
equation (14).
Investment Returns for Individual Accounts
In this illustrative model, the worker is assumed to allocate his IA investments
between two funds: an indexed stock fund and a bond fund (of 10-year
Treasuries). Denote by α the proportion invested by the participant in the
stock fund. Further, let St and Bt represent the total return at time t for each
of the funds. It follows that the portfolio investment rate of return in year t
is given by:
Rt = αSt + (1 − α)Bt . (8.15)
In Tables 4-1--4-3, the results are generated for three alternative portfolios
with α = 0%,α = 50%, and α = 100%.
D. Retirement Benefits Structure: Social Security Benefits and
Individual Account Payouts
Social Security Annuity
Denote by SSAT the annuity payment that a participant would receive if he
retired at age 62, under a stylized annuity benefit formula similar to, though
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not completely identical to, the existing law formulas. The first input to the
benefit formula is the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME)T . Here
we assume that the last thirty-five (annual) earnings are used in the AIMET
calculation. These are indexed with wage growth up to age 60, with the
exception of the last two earnings values.
AIMET =
WT−1 + WT−2 +∑T−3i=T−35 Wt ((1 + i)(1 + g ))T−2
35
(8.16)
The social security benefit formula involves the use of two ‘‘bendpoints,’’
indexed to the AWI and referred to below as FBPT and SBPT . In 2002,
the annualized bendpoints were $7,104 and $42,804, respectively. Present
law benefits are computed by multiplying the AIMET by 90 percent for the
portion below the first bendpoint, and by 32 percent and 15 percent for the
portions, respectively, below and above the second bendpoint. Finally, the
retiree’s benefits are subject to an early retirement reduction factor, denoted
by ERRT . According to SSA, ERRT = 75 percent for the participant with
T = 10 and ERRT = 70 percent for the other participants. The following
formula summarizes the benefit calculation.
SSAT = ERRT


90% × min(AIMET , FBPT )
+ 32% × (min(AIMET , SBPT )− FBPT ) if FBPT ≤ AIMET
+ 15% × (AIMET − SBPT ) if SBPT ≤ AIMET .
(8.17)
The value of the first pillar social security benefit SST is then obtained by
multiplying (17) by the annuity factor: SST = SSAT · a¨62.
Individual Account Payouts
In all models considered but one, system participants are permitted to divert
2 percent of their taxable earnings to an IA. (The exception is Example 5
where participants are allowed to contribute 6% of taxable earnings.) Let-
ting C represent the fixed contribution rate, then the dollar contribution in
year t is given by Ct = C ·Wt . The value of the IA at retirement is represented
by IAT . This value is computed as:
IAT =
T−1∑
t=0
Ct
T−1∏
j=t
(1 + Rj ). (8.18)
where Rj was defined in Section C.
Social Security Benefits for Individual Account Participants
Those who participate in the IAs reduce their contributions to the Social
Security Trust Fund, so their first pillar benefits are offset in exchange. For
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the present case, we compute the offset by accumulating IA contributions
with a stated rate of return RO ,
OffsetT =
T−1∑
t=0
Ct (1 + ROt )T−t . (8.19)
For this analysis we set ROt = exp(rt ) − 1; i.e. the offset rate is defined as
the risk-free rate. It follows that the expected present value of the reduced
benefits, denoted by SSREDT , is given by the following formula:
SSREDT = SST − OffsetT . (8.20)
The participant is then assumed to receive the sum of his IA and the reduced
social security annuity, or IAT + SSREDT .
E. Guarantee Formulas
Rate of Return Guarantees
Let RGt represent the guaranteed rate of return for any of the rate of return
guarantees described in the text. Then GT , the value of the guarantee at
retirement, is given by:
GT =
T−1∑
t=0
Ct
T−1∏
j=t
(1 + RGj ). (8.21)
For the principal guarantee and the real principal guarantee, we have RGt =
0 percent and RGt = i percent, respectively. Letting Bt represent the bond
return again, the 10-year Treasury guarantee is modeled using RGt = Bt . For
each of these examples, the guarantee payments are obtained by comparing
GT and IAT .
Minimum Benefit Guarantees
For Examples 4 and 5, let GT represent the present value of the guaranteed
annuity. Denoting by PLT the value of a poverty line annuity at retire-
ment, then GT = max(SST , PLT ). The guarantee payments are obtained by
comparing this amount to the ‘‘mixed’’ system benefit payment IAT +SSREDT .
F. Risk-Neutral Valuation and
Monte-Carlo Simulations
The results in the text are obtained by simulating the value of equation (8.4)
using the appropriate definition of the guarantee payoffs fT from equations
(8.1) and (8.3). Cost estimates are obtained by using 10,000 Monte Carlo
simulations. For Tables 4-1 and 4-3, these costs are divided, respectively, by∑T−1
t=0 Eˆ [e−r¯ t Ct ] and
∑T−1
t=0 Eˆ [e−r¯ t IAt ] to obtain the appropriate units.
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Notes
1See President’s CSSS 2001.
2See Jickling (2002) for an overview of the financial issues surrounding the Enron
collapse, and Mitchell and Utkus (Chapter 3, this volume) on company stock in
retirement plans.
3See, for instance, Benson (2001).
4Zarita (1994), Fischer (1999), and Pennachi (1999, 2000) discuss Latin American
pension guarantees.
5See Clark and Mitchell (2002) for Japan, and Maurer and Schlag (Chapter 9, this
volume) for Germany.
6Here we focus only on the accumulation phase of IAs, and not the decumulation
phase.
7The DeMint-Armey plan, for instance, guarantees benefits for those who elect a
balanced IA portfolio, but no additional value is assigned to either the guarantee or
the cost of providing a minimum benefit under government cost estimates.
8Smetters (2001) analyses various alternative specifications for this type of guarantee,
in the context of a complete conversion to IAs.
9The President’s CSSS (2001) identified several alternative ways to handle legacy
costs.
10This would arise if the provider of a guarantee has different circumstances from
that of the recipient (e.g. differential access to the capital market, a broader range
of investment choices, etc).
11How to value guarantees from the participant’s point of view will be discussed
in a future chapter. As a related issue, the approach we describe below makes no
assumptions regarding any particular IA participant’s risk aversion; in particular,
workers are not required to be neutral in their preferences for risk for the cost
estimates to hold.
12Standard references for option-pricing techniques include Duffie (1996) and Hull
(1997). Option-pricing techniques require defining an economy, that is a set of mar-
ket traded securities (e.g. a stock and a bond) along with their stochastic processes.
If a consumption plan (in this case, the pension guarantee payments) can be strictly
financed by a strategy involving only securities from the available set, then the cost
of the guarantee must equal the cost of the replicating strategy in order to rule
out ‘‘free lunches’’ (i.e. markets are dynamically complete and each consumption
plan can be replicated). Typically, ‘‘incompleteness’’ problems arise when the con-
sumption plan is a function of securities that are not market-traded. In the pension
guarantee case, workers’ earnings are likely to be problematic since their value can-
not be replicated in the markets. Despite the loss of the ‘‘no-arbitrage’’ argument,
if these non-replicable factors are relatively unimportant, option-pricing techniques
can still provide insight.
AQ: Not
listed please
check
13Specifically, the risk-free rate, workers’ earnings, stock returns, and bond returns
have to be modeled. In the appendix, we provide a model that is internally con-
sistent and allows for replication of the guarantee payments. For instance, internal
consistency requires that the relation between bond prices and discount rates be
taken into account when modeling bond returns. Following Pennachi (1999), we
assume that the risk-free rate follows a stochastic process represented by the Vasicek
(1977) model. In contrast to prior work, we take advantage of the simple relation
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between bond prices and the risk-free rate (under the Vasicek model) to derive the
stochastic process followed by bond returns. Since the stock and bond returns are
modeled separately, the total portfolio returns are simply obtained by adding the
two processes. This permits an actual replication of the guarantee payments with
market securities.
14This technique is also referred to as ‘‘martingale pricing.’’
15Deriving an analytical solution for (4) in the guarantee case requires an ana-
lytical expression for the probability distribution of the IA. In the Black--Scholes
framework with a single purchase, the underlying stock growth process is assumed
to be lognormal. In the IA framework, each year’s contribution is assumed to
grow according to a lognormal distribution, but the sum of these contributions
is not lognormal nor does it have a meaningful analytical representation. Hence
we evaluate equation (4) numerically using Monte Carlo simulation to illustrate the
costs of alternative pension guarantee designs.
16See for example Siegel (1998) on the relative historical performances of stocks
and bonds.
17Samuelson (1963) initially referred to this idea as the fallacy of large numbers; see
also Bodie (1995).
18When analysts use 30-year moving averages over the post-WWII period, these are
not independent draws from the underlying distribution. This point has been made
by various authors, including Bodie (2001).
19For example Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) conclude that the US equity mar-
ket had ‘‘the highest uninterrupted real rate of appreciation of all countries, at
4.3 percent annually from 1921 to 1996. For other countries, the median real appre-
ciation rate was 0.8 percent. The high return premium obtained for US equities
therefore appears to be the exception rather than the rule.’’
20This analysis does not incorporate the financing required to move to a fiscally
solvent system, since estimates of that cost are available elsewhere. Thus this exercise
estimates the marginal cost of providing a guarantee for an IA program, rather than
the cost of restoring the first pillar system to solvency. Details of the schematic model
used to represent the first pillar system appear in the Appendix. These two cases are
examples selected to identify the drivers of guarantee costs; neither coincides with
proposals devised by the President’s CSSS. In that group’s report, the first pillar plan
was assumed to be reformed with the advent of IAs, and IA contribution rates as well
as offset rates were set to bring fiscal solvency to the system as a whole. Our goal here
is not to establish costs of moving to solvency, but rather to outline the magnitude
and sensitivity of guarantee costs to different guarantee designs.
21To qualify for the poverty line minimum, the participant must contribute at least
30 years to the annuity component of the system.
22Neither of these examples corresponds to specific plans outlined by the Presid-
ent’s CSSS. In particular, the Commission included no guarantees in its proposed
reforms. Our objective here is to describe generic alternatives that help think about
guarantees, rather than to cost any specific proposal.
23This concept is equivalent to the concept of ‘‘moneyness’’ in option pricing. When
the strike price of an option is set equal to the stock price, the option is said to be
‘‘at-the-money’’ and its cost is solely driven by volatility. When the strike price of
a put option is larger (smaller) than the stock price, the option is said to be
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‘‘in-of-the-money’’ (‘‘out-the-money’’). In those cases, volatility is not the only factor
driving value and these options can be very cheap or expensive, respectively.
24The term ‘‘expected value’’ refers to the risk-adjusted expected value used to
determine the guarantee cost.
25In any mixed system, participants’ earnings levels will influence guarantee costs;
more generally, guarantee formulas and guaranteed benefits are likely to interact
nonlinearly with earnings.
26As a variant, they also mention the ‘‘collar’’ strategy of Feldstein and Ranguelova
(2000). With this strategy, the guarantee is financed by participants who give up
some of the upside return potential of the IA’s investment return. Smetters (2002)
also describes a similar financing strategy.
27In this chapter, we describe the guarantee as a put option on the IA. By ‘‘put-call
parity,’’ the combination of this put option and of the IA is equivalent to Bodie’s
strategy of investing in bonds and call options.
28Alier and Vittas (2001) discuss some alternative strategies to reduce IA risk when
it is not possible to manage this risk via the capital markets.
29Some private providers already offer guarantees with their investment accumula-
tion products; see Francis (2001).
30No adjustment for age is made, since the AWI is an average measure for workers
of all ages. Hence, earnings are likely overestimated for younger participants and
underestimated for older ones.
31Available at <www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/table4c6.html>.
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